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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes CI Fix b796897f8c fix(auth): unify site-wide 401/403 semantics (cma-auth-401-403-unify-20260915) 
require_auth now uses HTTPBearer(auto_error=False) and raises 401 explicitly
when the Authorization header is missing or non-Bearer, matching
require_auth_401. Unauthenticated requests are 401 for every user endpoint;
authenticated-but-forbidden (cross-entity / role) stays 403.

- app/auth_middleware.py: single optional bearer, 401 on missing token
  (require_auth_401 kept as a compatibility alias)
- tests: update 4 pre-existing cases that asserted 403 without a token
  (test_auth, test_reports, test_kpi_causality, test_expenses,
  test_api_auth_surface_20260914) - intentional behavior change
- add tests/test_auth_401_unification_20260915.py: sample + full sweep
  (all AUTHED GET routes -> 401), invalid token -> 401, cross-entity and
  role-denied still 403, bot channel (X-BOT-KEY) and public paths unchanged
 2026-09-15 17:00:52 +08:00
Hermes CI Fix 40d522cd34 fix(security): retire default-credential surface (yanxue-20260914-cma-defaultcred-code-fix) 
- Login.vue: no prefilled default creds; no anonymous entity enumeration on mount

- deploy.sh: readiness polling (0.5s/30s cap) replaces fixed sleep 3; login smoke reads same-source 600 secret file, missing file = explicit abort

- 19 verify/check/gen_report scripts: shared _admin_creds() loader (CMA_ADMIN_ENV -> ops .secrets -> profile copy); no hardcoded creds

- tests: single TEST_USER_PASSWORD fixture constant; docs: pointer to 600 secret file; removed 4 legacy .bak + pycache residue
 2026-09-14 17:39:53 +08:00
fullstack-bot b815b7f623 fix(security): close unauthenticated CMA user API surface + audit tool (cma-api-auth-surface-audit-20260914) 
Root cause: main.py include_router had no global auth dependency; user routers
(products/cost/predict/...) relied on assert_entity_scope, which treats a
missing session token as the Bot service channel and lets the request through.
Result: 46 user endpoints returned data without any token on a public site.

Changes:
- auth_middleware.py: add require_auth_401 (missing Bearer -> 401, delegates to
  require_auth otherwise); 401/403 semantics are explicit.
- router-level Depends(require_auth_401) on products, cost, predict,
  notifications, permissions, tenant, alignment; endpoint-level on
  /auth/roles and /admin/cache/clear.
- deps.py: document that get_entity_id/assert_entity_scope are NOT auth.
- frontend: add the missing Bearer header to 5 tokenless fetch/axios calls that
  hit the newly protected endpoints (KPIAlignment x2, RolePermissions x2,
  Dashboard x1).
- tests: new test_api_auth_surface_20260914.py (58 cases: no-token 401,
  token 200, cross-entity 403, bot channel unchanged); adapt test_predict /
  test_kpi_forecast to send session tokens like production.
- scripts/audit_api_auth_surface.py: reusable FastAPI dependency-graph audit
  (423 endpoints; A bot / B gap / C public), exits 1 when a B-class gap exists.
 2026-09-14 16:41:15 +08:00