Root cause: main.py include_router had no global auth dependency; user routers (products/cost/predict/...) relied on assert_entity_scope, which treats a missing session token as the Bot service channel and lets the request through. Result: 46 user endpoints returned data without any token on a public site. Changes: - auth_middleware.py: add require_auth_401 (missing Bearer -> 401, delegates to require_auth otherwise); 401/403 semantics are explicit. - router-level Depends(require_auth_401) on products, cost, predict, notifications, permissions, tenant, alignment; endpoint-level on /auth/roles and /admin/cache/clear. - deps.py: document that get_entity_id/assert_entity_scope are NOT auth. - frontend: add the missing Bearer header to 5 tokenless fetch/axios calls that hit the newly protected endpoints (KPIAlignment x2, RolePermissions x2, Dashboard x1). - tests: new test_api_auth_surface_20260914.py (58 cases: no-token 401, token 200, cross-entity 403, bot channel unchanged); adapt test_predict / test_kpi_forecast to send session tokens like production. - scripts/audit_api_auth_surface.py: reusable FastAPI dependency-graph audit (423 endpoints; A bot / B gap / C public), exits 1 when a B-class gap exists.
170 lines
8.2 KiB
Python
170 lines
8.2 KiB
Python
"""多租户公共依赖 — 账套模式:token优先,query/header降级为Bot服务白名单"""
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from fastapi import Request, Header, Query, Depends, HTTPException
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from typing import Optional
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app.database import get_db
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from app.auth_middleware import get_token_entity_id
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from app.models import Entity
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def get_entity_id(
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request: Request,
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x_entity_id: Optional[str] = Header(None, alias="X-Entity-Id"),
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entity_id: Optional[int] = Query(None, ge=1),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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) -> int:
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"""解析当前企业ID(账套模式):token优先 → query/header(Bot白名单)→ 默认1
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解析链(倒置后):
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1. Authorization Bearer token → 优先返回 token.entity_id(唯一可信来源)
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2. query参数 / X-Entity-Id header → 仅Bot服务通道使用(校验entity状态active)
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3. body中的 entity_id(POST场景)→ Bot服务通道兼容
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4. 兜底默认 1(酣客)
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安全说明:登录用户必须通过token绑定账套,query/header传入的entity_id
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在token存在时被忽略,防止越权传参(旧漏洞:query优先且无授权校验)。
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"""
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# 1. token优先(账套模式唯一来源)
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auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
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if auth.startswith("Bearer "):
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token_entity = get_token_entity_id(auth[7:])
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if token_entity is not None:
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# 越权防护:显式传入的 query/header entity_id 与 token 绑定不一致 → 403
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explicit = None
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if entity_id is not None:
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explicit = entity_id
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elif x_entity_id and x_entity_id.isdigit():
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explicit = int(x_entity_id)
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if explicit is not None and explicit != token_entity:
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raise HTTPException(403, f"无权访问企业 entity_id={explicit}(当前账套: {token_entity})")
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return token_entity
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# token存在但是旧格式/无entity → 账套模式下强制走白名单或默认(由require_auth拦截)
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# 这里不抛401:公开接口可能带旧token,交给require_auth统一处理
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# 2. query/header → Bot服务通道白名单(校验entity状态active)
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candidate = None
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if entity_id is not None:
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candidate = entity_id
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elif x_entity_id and x_entity_id.isdigit():
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candidate = int(x_entity_id)
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# 3. body 中的 entity_id(POST场景,Bot通道兼容)
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if candidate is None and request.method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH"):
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try:
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body = request.state.body_json or {}
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if body.get("entity_id"):
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candidate = int(body["entity_id"])
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except Exception:
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pass
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if candidate is not None:
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ent = db.query(Entity).filter(Entity.id == candidate).first()
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if ent and ent.status == "active":
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return candidate
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# Bot通道校验不通过:不返回默认,直接拒绝(防越权注入无效entity)
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raise HTTPException(403, f"企业 entity_id={candidate} 不存在或未激活")
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return 1 # 默认酣客(无token、无参数时兜底,兼容存量公开接口)
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def resolve_entity_for_request(request: Request, fallback: int = 1) -> int:
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"""账套模式:请求级entity解析(供从body读取entity_id的接口使用)
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登录用户(带Bearer token)→ token绑定的entity(唯一来源)
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无token(Bot服务通道)→ 回退到调用方传入的fallback(body中的entity_id等)
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"""
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auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
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if auth.startswith("Bearer "):
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token_entity = get_token_entity_id(auth[7:])
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if token_entity is not None:
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return token_entity
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return fallback
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# ============================================================
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# 跨租户读取防护(cma-cross-entity-endpoints-auth-20260914 补单)
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#
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# 背景:4 个只读端点(data-quality/governance-check、products/matrix、
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# alerts/risk-matrix、action-plans/coso-checklist)未做会话账套鉴权,
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# 用实体1(酣客)会话 token + 显式 entity 参数可读到实体2(博海)数据(HTTP 200)。
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# 本模块提供统一入口,行为对齐已正确 403 的 growth-quality / predict.accuracy:
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# - 会话 token 绑定实体 与 显式传入实体 不一致 → 403(文案同 get_entity_id)
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# - 字符串实体参数非法(非 hanke/bohai)→ 400 显式报错(不再静默回落酣客)
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# - 无 token(Bot 服务通道)→ 保持原白名单/默认行为,只补存在性校验
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# ============================================================
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# entity_id ↔ 实体 slug(字符串实体参数端点使用 hanke/bohai)
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ENTITY_SLUGS = {1: "hanke", 2: "bohai"}
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ENTITY_SLUG_TO_ID = {slug: eid for eid, slug in ENTITY_SLUGS.items()}
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def get_session_entity(request: Request) -> Optional[int]:
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"""会话账套实体:Bearer token 绑定的 entity_id(无 token / 旧格式 token → None)"""
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auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
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if not auth.startswith("Bearer "):
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return None
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return get_token_entity_id(auth[7:].strip())
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def assert_entity_scope(
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request: Request,
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explicit: Optional[int],
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db: Optional[Session] = None,
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) -> Optional[int]:
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"""显式 entity_id 的跨租户防护。
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- 会话 token 绑定实体存在(登录用户):explicit 与之不符 → 403(含 0=全部)
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- 无 token(Bot 服务通道):explicit 需存在且 active,否则 403(防越权注入)
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返回会话账套 entity_id(无 token → None,由调用方按原口径兜底)。
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⚠️ 契约(cma-api-auth-surface-audit-20260914):本函数**不是鉴权**。
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「无 token → 按 Bot 服务通道放行」这一分支**仅对真正以 X-BOT-KEY 鉴权的 Bot 端点有效**
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(bot_bridge / bot_kpis / bot_iron_law / bot_suggestions / cash_vouchers_json 等,
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见 app/api/bot_bridge.py 的 verify_bot_key)。
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用户端点(前端 Bearer 调用)**必须**在 router 级或端点级挂 `require_auth` /
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`require_auth_401`;否则未挂鉴权的用户端点 = 公开可访问(无 token 直接取数/写数)。
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自查:`grep -n 'require_auth' app/api/<文件>.py` 无命中 且 该文件路由非 /api/cma/bot* →
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即存在鉴权缺口。
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"""
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session_entity = get_session_entity(request)
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if session_entity is not None:
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if explicit is not None and explicit != session_entity:
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raise HTTPException(403, f"无权访问企业 entity_id={explicit}(当前账套: {session_entity})")
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return session_entity
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# Bot 服务通道:显式实体必须存在且 active(0=全部 不校验)
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if explicit is not None and explicit != 0 and db is not None:
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ent = db.query(Entity).filter(Entity.id == explicit).first()
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if not ent or ent.status != "active":
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raise HTTPException(403, f"企业 entity_id={explicit} 不存在或未激活")
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return None
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def assert_entity_slug_scope(request: Request, slug: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
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"""字符串实体参数(hanke/bohai)的跨租户防护 + 非法值显式报错。
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- 非法值 → 400 显式报错(不再静默回落酣客数据导致 UI 标签与数据不一致)
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- 合法但与会话账套不一致 → 403(文案同 get_entity_id)
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返回规范化 slug;slug 为空 → None(调用方按会话账套/默认兜底)。
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"""
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if slug is None or str(slug).strip() == "":
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return None
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key = str(slug).strip().lower()
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if key not in ENTITY_SLUG_TO_ID:
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raise HTTPException(
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400,
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f"非法实体 entity={slug}(合法值: hanke/bohai)",
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)
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eid = ENTITY_SLUG_TO_ID[key]
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session_entity = get_session_entity(request)
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if session_entity is not None and eid != session_entity:
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raise HTTPException(403, f"无权访问企业 entity_id={eid}(当前账套: {session_entity})")
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return key
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def resolve_session_slug(request: Request, default: str = "hanke") -> str:
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"""无显式实体参数时,按会话账套取默认 slug(无 token → default)"""
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session_entity = get_session_entity(request)
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if session_entity is None:
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return default
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return ENTITY_SLUGS.get(session_entity, default)
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